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UNITED STATES V. WECHT: WHEN ANONYMOUS JURIES,
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS, AND JUDICIAL
DISCRETION COLLIDE
Seth A. Fersko

∗

I.INTRODUCTION
The United States was a young country in 1807 when proceed1
ings began in Aaron Burr’s treason trial. The former vice president
sat accused of treason for allegedly conspiring to wage war against the
2
United States. By all accounts, the trial was such a spectacle that the
country had not seen anything like it before, even during the colonial
period. Although newspapers at the time virtually ignored the courts,
the Burr trial “captivated the American public’s attention,” and the
3
newspapers happily obliged the public’s interest. The news reports
were so invasive and the editorials were so provocative that Burr al4
leged that the coverage prejudiced the jury against him. Acknowledging that some jurors might have formed opinions, Chief Justice
5
John Marshall, serving as the trial judge, instructed the jury to re-
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1
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 2 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
2
See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 2 (2006),
http://www.fjc.gov/history/burr.nsf/page/burr_pdf/$file/BurrTrial(final).pdf.
3
Id. at 34.
4
See COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYS., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE “FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL” ISSUE, 45 F.R.D.
391, 394 n.2 (1968) [hereinafter FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT].
5
Burr’s trial took place in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Virginia because it had original jurisdiction. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 2. In the early nineteenth
century, the circuit courts lacked their own judges, which meant that one Justice
from the Supreme Court of the United States and one district court judge from the
circuit sat on the circuit court. See HOBSON, supra note 2, at 9. Thus, Chief Justice
Marshall, as the Supreme Court Justice assigned to the Circuit Court for the District
of Virginia, presided over Burr’s trial as the trial judge. See id.
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main open to the evidence and witness testimony. Despite the pre7
judicial media coverage, the jury acquitted Burr of treason.
Since 1807, courts have occasionally witnessed high public inter8
est in criminal trials. In the early 1920s, the newspapers and public
9
carefully followed the Sacco and Vanzetti arrests and murder trial.
The media coverage continued throughout the defendants’ appeals
10
and right up to their execution. Reporters even tracked down the
original jurors from the trial—seven years after the guilty verdicts—to
11
ask whether, in hindsight, they thought that the trial was fair. The
intensity and pervasiveness of the media’s trial coverage, however,
12
took on a new character in the 1950s with the advent of television
13
and the growth of broadcast news.
The justice system witnessed one of the first modern media fren14
zies in the 1954 murder trial of Dr. Samuel Sheppard. The prosecution accused Dr. Sheppard, a “handsome, 30-year-old” doctor from an

6
See 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 415
(Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808).
7
See HOBSON, supra note 2, at 11–12.
8
See ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 21 (1968) (noting that the intertwining of the
justice system and media coverage “has not suddenly descended upon us as a result
of the rapid growth of communications in the twentieth century”).
9
See, e.g., Louis Stark, Are Sacco and Vanzetti Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1922, at 3.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts convicted Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti for murdering a paymaster and a security guard during the course of a payroll
robbery. See id. The trial was highly politicized because Sacco and Vanzetti were
members of an Italian-American anarchist group connected to the Red Scare. See id.
at 3, 14.
10
See generally Commonwealth v. Sacco, 158 N.E. 167 (Mass. 1927) (recounting
and denying the defendants’ challenges to their trial’s fairness); Sacco Jurors Still
Think Trial Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1927, at 28.
11
See Sacco Jurors Still Think Trial Fair, supra note 10.
12
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (recognizing the “pervasiveness of modern communications”); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS, supra note 8, at 21–22 (noting that the “wider distribution of information”
makes the interaction between the criminal-justice system and the media more problematic).
13
See generally SIG MICKELSON, THE DECADE THAT SHAPED TELEVISION NEWS: CBS IN
THE 1950S (1998); see also Kimba M. Wood, Re-Examining the Access Doctrine, COMM.
LAW., Winter 1994, at 3, 4 (noting that “there was far less concern about the effect of
pretrial publicity 200 years ago and little or no cause for concern about the juror’s
privacy interests”).
14
See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358.
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Ohio suburb, of brutally murdering his pregnant, thirty-one-year-old
15
wife. The press’s daily trial coverage included
[a]bout fifty reporters from newspapers, news services, radio and television networks, with perhaps twenty still and
movie camera men . . . swarmed over the court house.
Except [for] eight or ten seats in the last row, all places in
the court room not occupied by participants and attendants
16
[were] filled by the press.
Not only were critics concerned about the fairness of the process to
Dr. Sheppard, the trial also raised serious questions about the privacy
17
of jurors because of the pervasive media coverage.
During the years following the Sheppard trial and Dr. Sheppard’s appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States in Sheppard
18
v. Maxwell, the legal community recognized the need to address how
the media covers high-profile trials and the negative influence exces19
sive media coverage can have on the trial itself. Congress also em-

15

Ira Henry Freeman, Sheppard’s Trial Interests Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1954, at

83.
16

Id. In contrast, the 1966 retrial of Dr. Sheppard saw the trial judge implement
more stringent courtroom controls on the media, the lack of which was the Supreme
Court’s main criticism of the trial judge in the first trial. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at
358–63; Press Rules Set in Sheppard Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1966, at 1 (The judge
“barred cameras, sound recording devices and stenographic machines from the
courthouse during the trial or related proceedings and at any recess or adjournment.
He also banned the installation of teletype machines or special telephones. He said
there would be 14 seats reserved for the press.”).
17
See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353 (observing that the media and public subjected
the jurors to intense scrutiny, which included the jurors seeing their pictures in the
news and receiving letters from unknown persons concerning the trial).
18
Id. at 353.
19
See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, supra note 8; FREE
PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT, supra NOTE 4; THE SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND
THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967); TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
PUBLICITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (1976). Aside from Sheppard, a number of other cases spurred the legal community to address how the media
covers trials. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550–52 (1965) (describing how the
publicity of the defendant’s pretrial hearing violated his Sixth Amendment rights);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (asserting that the “spectacle” of the
defendant confessing to the police on a local television station was the defendant’s
trial for any member of the juror pool who watched it); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
725–29 (1961) (describing how the publicity surrounding the trial made it impossible to find an impartial jury); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 311–13 (1959)
(describing how news articles, which discussed the defendant’s prior convictions,
read by the jurors during trial had to have prejudiced the jury because this information was previously excluded by the trial judge as too prejudicial to the defendant).
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braced the idea of greater judicial discretion and control over crimi20
nal proceedings. As a result, district courts have relied on case law,
statutes, and their inherent judicial authority to address intense media coverage, including withholding jurors’ identities from the public
21
by using anonymous juries. In contrast, because of the media’s First

20

See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2006). The primary impetus behind the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 was the Civil Rights Movement. JEFFREY ABRAMSON,
WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 100 (1994) (stating that
by moving to a cross-sectional jury system, Congress aimed “to strip away [racial] discrimination,” and as a result, the jury could “achieve . . . [an] impartiality that comes
from balancing the biases of its members against each other”). Nonetheless, Congress did not adopt all of the 1968 provisions with the Civil Rights Movement in
mind. For example, the legislative history indicates that Congress adopted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1863(b)(7) to permit the current practices in the various federal district courts to
persist. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1792, 1801. Given that 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) dealt with when to publicize juror
names, Congress’s determination had to go beyond considerations based solely on
racial discrimination and include the media’s role in the courtroom, which Congress
decided the local district courts were in the best position to handle. See id. In this
sense, it appears that Congress concurred with the Supreme Court when it recognized the need for greater control of the courtroom by trial judges in light of excessive media coverage. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966)
(“[U]nfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become increasingly
prevalent. Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury
free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications
and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused. . . . [T]he cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent
the prejudice at its inception.”).
21
See United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 914 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91–
93 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 (D.D.C.
2008); United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625–26 (N.D. Ill. 2007). In the
past, courts have also imposed gag orders on the press or participants in the case. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966) (suggesting that the trial judge could
have imposed a gag order on trial participants as it related to the release of prejudicial information); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)
(upholding the sanctioning of an attorney for the attorney’s prejudicial statements
about a pending case). Compare Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570
(1976) (holding that gag orders on the press are presumptively unconstitutional),
with United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting a
narrowly tailored gag order to prevent the press from airing the private discussions of
the defendant and the defendant’s lawyers). In narrow circumstances, courts may
close trial proceedings. See infra Part II.C. Even if the courts may not close trial proceedings, they may still limit the media’s presence in the courtroom. See generally
Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333. Last, the court may sequester the trial jurors. See, e.g., id. at
352–53, 363 (noting that one of the problems in Dr. Sheppard’s trial was that the
judge failed to even raise “sequestration of the jury . . . sua sponte with counsel” despite the media subjecting the jurors “to [the same] newspaper, radio and television
coverage . . . [as] the trial [itself, even] while not taking part in the proceedings”).
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Amendment right of access and the inherent benefits of public trials
and media scrutiny, the Supreme Court has voiced concern over ex22
cessive judicial measures that close proceedings from the public eye.
For these reasons, in 1986, the Supreme Court adopted the “expe23
rience and logic” test. The “experience and logic” test seeks a balance between too much and too little public access under the First
Amendment by instructing courts when proceedings must be open or
24
may be closed.
Courts determine whether the “experience and logic” test
weighs in favor of a First Amendment right of access by examining
both the historical openness of the proceeding and the benefits and
25
detriments of public access. If a First Amendment right attaches,
26
then a presumption of openness applies. A court can close a proceeding and overcome this presumption only when detailed, case27
specific findings reveal the necessity of closure. On the other hand,
when the First Amendment does not attach, the courts need not
28
overcome a constitutional burden to close the proceedings. Thus,
courts have far greater discretion and control over the trial process

22
See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7
(1986); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577–80 (1980).
23
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.
24
Compare United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
the First Amendment right of access attaches to plea hearings), with United States v.
Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1405 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment right
of access does not attach to all pretrial hearings).
25
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9.
26
See id. at 9.
27
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984).
28
Compare id. (holding that a district court judge, to close a proceeding under
the First Amendment, must base closure on specific findings that show (1) the existence of an “overriding interest”—any interest that “is essential to preserve higher
values” than the value of openness—and (2) that closure is “narrowly tailored to
serve that interest”), with Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978)
(stating that appellate courts should review a district court judge’s denial of access to
judicial records under the common-law right of access only for abuse of discretion),
and Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Under common law, there is a presumption of access accorded to judicial records. This
presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if countervailing interests heavily
outweigh the public interests in access. The trial court may weigh ‘the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interests and the duty of the courts.’ The
party seeking to overcome the presumption bears the burden of showing some significant interest that outweighs the presumption.”) (internal citations omitted).
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when a First Amendment right does not attach because they do not
29
need to overcome a constitutional presumption of openness.
The “experience and logic” test and the stability it achieves have
worked well, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit up30
set the status quo in United States v. Wecht (Wecht II). In Wecht II, the
Third Circuit held that the media has a First Amendment right of
31
access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors. Yet legal
tradition and policy considerations weigh against the Third Circuit’s
holding under the “experience and logic” test.
If Wecht II endures, district judges will lose a significant amount
of discretion over the jury-selection process and will no longer control when or how the court releases prospective jurors’ identities to
the public in high-profile trials. Instead of using their inherent and
statutory discretion, courts would first need to rebut a strong, constitutional presumption—rather than a common-law presumption—
that the jurors’ identities are publicly available. By making it more
difficult for the district courts to exercise their discretion during jury
selection, Wecht II ignores the history that led to the “experience and
logic” test and the delicate policy balance that the Supreme Court
and Congress achieved.
This Comment contends that, under the “experience and logic”
test, the First Amendment does not apply to prospective jurors’ identi32
ties during jury selection. Therefore, the First Amendment does not
require that courts disclose prospective jurors’ identities to the public
when the parties have not finished jury selection in a high-profile
case that lacks safety concerns. Part II of this Comment introduces
the concept of the anonymous jury and the source of the district
judge’s authority to empanel an anonymous jury. Part II also
presents the constitutional issues raised by an anonymous jury and
the current case law addressing those issues. Part III discusses the
unprecedented decision in Wecht II, which creates a constitutional
29

See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (“The common law [right of access] does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and the public as
does the First Amendment [right of access].”).
30
537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008).
31
See generally id.
32
This Comment does not address the following issues: (1) whether prospective
jurors’ identities should be withheld from the public beyond empanelment; (2)
whether prospective jurors’ identities should be anonymous to the parties, rather than
the public, when the trial does not raise safety concerns; and (3) whether actual trial
jurors’ identities should be anonymous in high-profile trials that do not raise safety
concerns.
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right to obtain the identities of prospective jurors. Part IV analyzes
the ways in which the Wecht II court misapplied the “experience and
logic” test. Part IV also evaluates the potential effects of Wecht II and
how, if followed, it might substantially affect the balance achieved between media-access concerns and concerns for juror privacy and systemic integrity.
II.BACKGROUND ON ANONYMOUS JURIES AND COMMON
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. The History and Development of Anonymous Juries

33

A jury is anonymous when all information regarding the jurors is
public, such as their ethnicity, age, level of education, and other
background information, with the exception of the jurors’ identi34
ties. In the past, courts have hidden the identity of jurors from both
35
36
the defendant and the public or only from the public. Courts also
vary the duration of a jury’s anonymity, releasing the jurors’ names
37
before empanelment, after empanelment, or not at all. Additionally, courts diverge on the amount of information to withhold to keep
the jury anonymous. For example, while courts sometimes withhold
only the names and addresses, other times courts also withhold the

33

Courts occasionally use the term “innominate” jury. See, e.g., United States v.
Bowman, 302 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “innominate” is the appropriate label when the “parties knew everything about the jurors except their [last]
names”). Although the use of the term “anonymous” jury seems appropriate when
nothing is known about the jurors because the term summons images of a “clandestine, forbidden, and obscure” venire, the term “anonymous” is more commonly utilized and is the term used in this Comment. United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962,
963 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001).
34
A juror’s identity consists of both the juror’s name and address. See In re Globe
Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In the case of many familiar
names, an address as well as the name is necessary to identify the individual.”).
35
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding
use of jury that was anonymous to the defendant and the public).
36
See, e.g., United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622–30 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(upholding use of anonymous jury where the defendant argued for closure and the
media argued in favor of public access).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding
use of anonymous jury and denial of media’s request for juror identities postverdict); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (permitting
the withholding of the jurors’ names from the public for seven days after the verdict
was handed down, to adequately protect the jurors’ privacy).
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38

place of employment, ethnicity, or religion. This Comment deals
with anonymous juries in federal criminal trials where the district
court withholds the names and addresses of prospective jurors from
the public prior to empanelment but discloses the names and addresses to the parties.
Many scholars consider United States v. Barnes to be the first example of a court upholding the use of an anonymous jury after the
39
court empaneled and swore in the trial jurors. While Barnes might
be the first case in which a court used an anonymous jury throughout
the entire trial, the case law suggests that the Supreme Court and
Congress permitted district courts to deny defendants the jurors’
names and addresses through the empanelment stage of trial before
40
the 1970s. By extension, the Supreme Court and Congress must
have permitted the district courts to withhold the jurors’ identities
from the public as well. Logistically, it is difficult to foresee how a
court could withhold the jurors’ identities from the defendant while
making the jurors’ identities available to the public.
41
In Hamer v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the defendant the list of prospective jurors, which contained the prospec42
tive jurors’ names and addresses, during voir dire. The court relied

38

See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1191–92 (2d Cir. 1991)
(upholding district court’s order to withhold jurors’ names, addresses, and places of
employment); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140–43 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding anonymous jury where district court withheld jurors’ names, addresses, religion,
and ethnicity); United States v. Melendez, 743 F. Supp. 134, 138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(permitting the withholding of jurors’ first names, specific addresses, and places of
employment but allowing disclosure of jurors’ last names, general area of residence,
and types of employment).
39
See Barnes, 604 F.2d at 140–41; see, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Anonymous Juries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 457, 457 (1999) (noting that Barnes was “the first fully anonymous jury in
American History”). In this case, the defendant stood accused of a number of serious drug distribution charges, and in New York, such defendants had a welldocumented “history of attempts at influencing witnesses and jurors.” Barnes, 604
F.2d at 134 & n.3. As a result, the court withheld the trial jurors’ names and addresses from the public and both parties for the entire trial out of a concern for juror
safety rather than a concern over the biases that might result from excessive media
coverage. See id. at 140–41.
40
See infra notes 41–64 and accompanying text.
41
259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958).
42
See id. at 277–79. The Ninth Circuit also permitted the district judge to prevent
defendant’s counsel from asking for the prospective jurors’ names and addresses
during voir dire. See id.
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43

upon Pointer v. United States, in which Supreme Court Justice John
Marshall Harlan, writing for the majority, stated,
[T]he mode of designating and impaneling jurors for the
trial of cases in the courts of the United States is within the
control of those courts, subject only to the restrictions congress [sic] has prescribed, and also to such limitations as are
recognized by the settled principles of criminal law to be es44
sential in securing impartial juries for the trial of offenses.
The Hamer court observed that Congress only required that the defendant receive a list of prospective jurors in trials for treason and
45
other capital offenses. Given that the government indicted the defendant for a noncapital offense, the court held that the jury could
46
remain anonymous to the defendant through empanelment. Moreover, if the defendant did not have a right to know the jurors’ identities, then the public, by extension, must not have had a right to this
information either.
The Ninth Circuit was hardly the first court to hold that district
judges had the discretion to keep prospective jurors anonymous by
withholding lists of prospective jurors from defendants in noncapital
47
cases. In 1891 in United States v. Van Duzee, the Supreme Court recognized that persons indicted for noncapital offenses were not “en48
titled to a list of . . . jurors.” Even as far back as 1818, the Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania only required the delivery of prospective-juror lists in cases of treason and other capital offenses and held that the right to juror lists did not extend to nonca-

43

151 U.S. 396 (1894); see Hamer, 259 F.2d at 278.
Pointer, 151 U.S. at 407–08.
45
See Hamer, 259 F.2d at 278. The court referenced 18 U.S.C. § 3432, which was
amended in 1994 to include an exception, even in the case of treason and other capital offenses, “if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that providing
the list may jeopardize the life or safety of any person.” Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60025, 108 Stat. 1982 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006)).
46
See Hamer, 259 F.2d at 276–79.
47
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 104 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1939) (upholding the
trial judge’s order forbidding the clerk from distributing the jury list to anyone other
than the marshal before the first day of trial and, even then, indicating that distribution on the first day of trial is within the “sound discretion of the trial court”); see also
Stone v. United States, 324 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1963) (affirming Wilson); Spivey v.
United States, 109 F.2d 181, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1940) (affirming Wilson).
48
140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891).
44

FERSKO (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

772

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

5/20/2010 5:00 PM

[Vol. 40:763

49

pital offenses. In fact, district judges had the authority to deny juror
lists to defendants in all noncapital cases since 1790 because Congress
50
only gave defendants the right to a juror list in capital cases.
While Barnes was the first case to use an anonymous jury for the
entire trial, the modern trend of empanelling anonymous juries,
which Barnes represents, has strong roots in the concerns that the Supreme Court raised to the intense media coverage surrounding the
trial of Dr. Sheppard in 1954. Unlike the prior case law, Sheppard
shifted the conflict from one between the trial court and the defendant’s right to juror lists before empanelment to a conflict between
the trial court and the media’s right to jurors’ identities before em51
panelment, after empanelment, and post-trial.
In Sheppard, the local authorities arrested the defendant, Dr.
52
Sheppard, for murdering his wife. Although Dr. Sheppard maintained his innocence, the press vilified him both before and during
53
the trial. The Supreme Court characterized the atmosphere of the
54
trial as that of a “carnival.” Although the Supreme Court recognized

49

See United States v. Wood, 28 F.Cas. 754, 755 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818); see also Van
Duzee, 140 U.S. at 173 (citing Wood with approval).
50
See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (“[A]ny person who shall
be accused and indicted of treason, shall have . . . a list of the jury and witnesses . . .
mentioning the names and places of abode of such witnesses and jurors, delivered
unto him at least three entire days before he shall be tried for the same; and in other
capital offences, shall have such copy of the indictment and list of the jury two entire
days at least before the trial.”). Although not the topic of this Comment, one wonders whether there was ever a common-law right to prospective-juror lists before empanelment given that Congress thought it was necessary to enact a statute creating
this right in trials for treason and other capital offenses.
51
This Comment focuses exclusively on the use of an anonymous jury up until
empanelment. Consequently, this Comment primarily discusses the media’s right of
access to prospective juror identities prior to the trial judge swearing in the actual trial
jurors.
52
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 336, 341 (1966).
53
See id. at 338–49.
54
Id. at 358. The “totality of the circumstances” were suggestive of the inherent
unfairness of the trial. Id. at 352–53. The jurors
were subjected to newspaper, radio and television coverage of the trial
while not taking part in the proceedings. They were allowed to go
their separate ways . . . without adequate directions not to read or listen to anything concerning the case . . . . The numerous pictures of
the jurors, with their addresses, which appeared in the newspapers before and during the trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion
from both cranks and friends. The fact that anonymous letters had
been received by prospective jurors should have made the judge aware
that this publicity seriously threatened the jurors’ privacy.
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that a “responsible press” is the “handmaiden of effective judicial
55
administration,” the Court also asserted that trial judges must address the “pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficul56
ty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors.” Moreover, the Court insisted that trial judges have the power to protect
57
against prejudicial publicity.
In 1968, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of
58
59
1968. Partially in response to Sheppard, Congress authorized each
district court to adopt a jury-selection plan that would determine
when the district judges must release the prospective jurors’ names to
60
the parties and the public. Congress, however, did not require that
61
each district court make the prospective jurors’ names public. In
fact, Congress intended that the statute—28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7)—
62
codify the various existing practices in the country’s district courts.

Id. at 353. “In light of this background . . . the arrangements made by the judge with
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that ‘judicial serenity and calm to
which (he) was entitled.’” Id. at 355 (internal citation omitted).
55
Id. at 350 (“A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in
this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”).
56
Id. at 362.
57
See id. at 357–63 (noting a number of options that the trial judge had at his
disposal to reign in the excessive media coverage).
58
Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869
(2006)).
59
See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2008) (Van
Antwerpen, J., dissenting) (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d at 92 (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1801));
see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
60
See § 1863(b)(7) (The “plan shall . . . fix the time when the names drawn from
the qualified jury wheel shall be disclosed to [the] parties and to the public”).
61
See id. (“If the plan permits these names to be made public.” (emphasis added)).
62
See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (“It thereby permits the present diversity of practice to continue.”). Since 1790, Congress required a particular procedure for disclosing jurors’ identities to defendants in capital cases. See Act of Apr. 30,
1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006). Congress, however, did not specify when or if the public was entitled to such information in capital
cases, and it did not specify anything with respect to noncapital cases. In these circumstances, each district developed its own practice. For example, the Ninth Circuit, instead of creating a set procedure for releasing jurors’ identities to the public,
put the decision in the hands of the district courts, which acted according to the trial
judge’s discretion. See Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 278–80 (9th Cir. 1958)
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Additionally, even if the plan adopted by the district court required
the district judges to release prospective jurors’ names, Congress authorized the district judges to “keep these names confidential in any
63
case where the interests of justice so require.” Thus, when modern-day
courts exercise their authority to empanel an anonymous jury, they
64
rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7).
District courts aim to promote the use of public trials and thus
65
are unlikely to use anonymous juries with any regularity. Nonetheless, when determining whether to withhold jurors’ identities, district
courts look to any number of factors, including “(1) the defendant’s
involvement in organized crime; (2) the defendant’s participation in
a group with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendant’s past attempts to interfere with the judicial process; (4) the fact that the defendant faces a lengthy prison term or substantial fine; and (5) exten66
sive media publicity.” If these factors weigh in favor of anonymity,
the district court will exercise its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury.
(holding that congressional purpose and intent indicates that the courts are not required to release jurors’ names and addresses to the defendant before trials for “lesser offenses”); see also Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 527–30 (9th Cir. 1959)
(affirming Hamer in holding that the defendant was not entitled to the names and
addresses of prospective jurors where the statutes and Constitution do not provide
such a right).
63
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (2006) (emphasis added). The statute does not specify
up until what point in the trial courts may keep the names confidential. Presumably,
Congress intended that the courts interpret this timeframe’s length. First, Congress
codified existing practices, which suggests that Congress was permitting the practices
already authorized by the courts. Second, the statute permits the withholding of
identities if justice so requires, which suggests that the courts make this determination on a case-by-case basis.
64
Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3432, 28 U.S.C. § 1863 bestows district judges with the right
to withhold jurors’ identities. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3432, with § 1863(b)(7). The
courts’ power under § 3432 is implied, rather than express, because § 3432 expressly
grants defendants the right to juror lists only in trials for treason and other capital
offenses. See § 3432. For example, the district court judge in United States v. Wecht
empaneled an anonymous jury in reliance on his authority under § 1863(b)(7) and
without relying on the failure of § 3432 to grant the right to a jury list to the defendant. United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007) (order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury).
65
See AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS
(AND
COMMENTARY)
88
(2005),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/
juryprojectstandards/The_ABA_Principles_for_Juries_and_Jury_Trials.pdf (suggesting that open proceedings educate the public and instill confidence in the judiciary,
which is in the interests of the courts not to erode, and anonymous juries thus should
not be used absent “a genuine problem in a particular case”).
66
Id. at 87.
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B. Sixth Amendment Challenges to Anonymous Juries
Both defendants and the media may raise constitutional challenges to anonymous juries in criminal trials. Defendants mount
their challenges based on the Sixth Amendment “right to a speedy
67
and public trial, by an impartial jury.” As a result, defendants usually raise two arguments: (1) an anonymous jury violates the right to a
68
public trial, and (2) an anonymous jury violates the guarantee of an
69
impartial jury. Although controversies regarding defendant chal70
lenges under the Sixth Amendment are by no means settled issues,
the less-settled issues relate to the media’s right of access under the
First Amendment.
67

U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has found that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a public trial does not grant the media a right of access
because the right to a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant, not the media.
See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979). But some commentators
have suggested that Gannett is ripe for reconsideration by the Supreme Court. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 111–14 (1998) (“[E]ven if a defendant might
prefer a closed proceeding (consider, for example, the British officers tried for their
role in the Boston Massacre), the republican ideology underlying the public-trial
clause [of the Sixth Amendment] overrode that preference in the name of democratic openness and education, public confidence, anticorruption, and truth seeking.”).
68
See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (stating that the public trial
ensures a fair trial and that the First and Sixth Amendments are equally protective of
this right but that the public trial is mainly for the defendant’s protection). While a
defendant may waive the right to a public trial, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the right to a closed trial. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
34–35 (1965). The defendant does not have a constitutional right to closure because
the “right to an open public trial is . . . [the] right of the accused and the public,”
which means that the First Amendment right of access may keep the trial open to the
public when the defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. See
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (“An anonymous jury raises the specter that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom
jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the defendant’s constitutional right to
a presumption of innocence.”). The defendant’s right to select a jury of the defendant’s choosing is another challenge to anonymous juries that relates to the guarantee of an impartial jury. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044, 1051–52
(2d Cir. 1979) (denying defendant’s argument that without the prospective jurors’
addresses the defendant could not properly use the peremptory challenge).
70
The specific questions that are unsettled relate to whether this right of access
extends to documents, evidence, and other information as opposed to the ability to
attend and observe courtroom proceedings. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Broad. Co., 828 F.2d
340 (6th Cir. 1987) (determining whether access extends to documents used to disqualify a judge from the case); United States v. Eaves, 685 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga.
1988) (determining whether access extends to recordings used as evidence); United
States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987) (determining whether access extends to jurors’ names and addresses after the verdict).
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C. First Amendment Challenges to Anonymous Juries
71

The press enjoys certain rights under the First Amendment,
72
which include the right to attend criminal trials. The media’s right
of access to the courtroom flows from its position as the proxy of the
73
public. The courtroom is “a public place,” and historically, the public’s attendance at trials has “enhance[d] the integrity and quality of
74
what takes place.” Without this access, the essential rights to free
75
speech and a free press “could be eviscerated.” Because of the importance of access, a rebuttable presumption of openness attaches to
76
77
preliminary hearings as well as to voir dire proceedings.
Under Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), the
Supreme Court requires courts to use a two-prong test—the “experience and logic” test—to determine whether the First Amendment’s
78
presumption of openness attaches to a proceeding. Under the experience prong, the courts look to the history of the proceeding in
issue to determine whether it has traditionally been open to the pub79
lic. The court, however, “does not look to the particular experience
of any one jurisdiction, but instead ‘to the experience in that type or
80
kind of hearing throughout the United States.’” The courts then
examine the logic prong by evaluating whether public access will positively and “significant[ly]” affect the functioning of the proceed81
ing. If the two prongs weigh in favor of public access, then the First
71
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
72
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
73
See id. at 577 n.12; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397–98
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]his constitutional protection derives . . . because
‘[i]n seeking out the news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at large . . . .’”)
(internal citations omitted).
74
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578.
75
Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
76
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 13
(1986).
77
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510–
13 (1984).
78
478 U.S. at 9.
79
See id. at 8 (The experience prong asks “whether the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public.”).
80
El Vocero de P. R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (internal citations
omitted).
81
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (The logic prong asks “whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process”); see
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)
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Amendment protects that proceeding, which means a presumption
82
83
of openness attaches. Yet the presumption is not absolute.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), the Supreme Court indicated that an “overriding interest” could rebut the
84
presumption of openness. Without giving any examples, the Supreme Court defined an “overriding interest” as any interest that “is
85
essential to preserve higher values” than the value of openness. District courts must base closure on two specific findings—one showing
the greater interest that closure will protect and a second showing
86
that closure is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” By making
specific findings, the district court ensures that an appellate court can
87
accurately review the closure order.
III.THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO ANONYMOUS JURIES IN
UNITED STATES V. WECHT
In United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), the Third Circuit held that the
media has a First Amendment right to the names and addresses of
prospective jurors before voir dire even where the district judge ordered the empanelment of a jury that would be anonymous to the
88
public but not to the defendant.
(noting that openness “enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system”) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) (listing “six societal interests in open court proceedings that the Richmond Newspapers
Court had found: [1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by
providing the public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system;
[2] promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by
permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a significant community
therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion; [4]
serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public
scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all involved; and [6] discouragement of perjury”).
82
See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.
83
See id.; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
84
464 U.S. at 510; see also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9–10 (reaffirming the rule
on rebutting the presumption of openness set forth in Press-Enterprise I).
85
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
86
Id.
87
See id.; see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
88
See generally 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008). Although the court says that the First
Amendment right of access to jurors’ names and addresses attaches no later than
empanelment, the court’s opinion implies that this right attaches much earlier, even
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The U.S. Department of Justice brought corruption charges
against Dr. Cyril H. Wecht in January 2006 for unlawfully using “his
public office as coroner of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, for pri90
vate financial gain.” The media took an immediate interest in Dr.
Wecht’s case because he is a controversial forensics consultant and
because he was charged in the 1970s with using the Allegheny County
91
morgue for personal gain.
The parties agreed to use a twenty-four-page questionnaire with
sixty-nine questions in the voir dire process in 2006 for the first sche92
duled trial. By the time the court mailed the questionnaires “to 300
prospective jurors” in July 2006, the parties had also agreed that each
prospective juror would return the completed questionnaire to the
93
Jury Administrator. Under the jury-selection procedure, the Jury
Administrator would distribute the questionnaire to the court and
parties once the Jury Administrator removed and retained the last
page of the questionnaire, which contained only “[t]he juror’s full
94
name, home address, and signature.” As a result, the identity of the
before voir dire. The court was willing to give the Media-Intervenors access to the
identity of the prospective jurors such that “the prospective jurors will not be anonymous” and “the Media-Intervenors will have . . . information to investigate and
detect possible improper bias in ‘for cause’ determinations.” Id. at 243. Yet “for
cause” determinations occur during voir dire, which takes place prior to empanelment. The Media-Intervenors cannot possibly investigate the prospective jurors’
names during voir dire if the Third Circuit only requires disclosure at empanelment.
Therefore, it appears that the Third Circuit believes that the right of access attaches,
at the very least, during voir dire, if not earlier.
89
The Department of Justice filed the case in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. See id. at 224. Judge Arthur Schwab was the presiding judge. See id.
90
Id. at 224 (internal citations omitted).
91
See Charlie Deitch, The Wecht Files, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Dec. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.pittsburghcitypaper.ws/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A39852
(explaining that Dr. Wecht is known for having challenged the Warren Commission
on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was really a lone gunman, claimed on 20/20 that Elvis Presley died from a drug overdose and not a heart problem, and asserted in a tabloid that Jon Benet Ramsey died accidentally at the hands of her father). For more
on the celebrity status of Dr. Wecht, see Famed Forensic Witness Fights Fraud Charges,
USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-19celebrity-pathologist_N.htm; Dennis Roddy, Dr. Wecht’s Silent Treatment, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06043/
653778-156.stm.
92
See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007)
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury).
93
Id.
94
Id. The last page of the questionnaire was the only page that contained the
individual juror’s name and address. Id.
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jury pool would remain anonymous to all except the Jury Administra95
tor. Neither the parties nor the media objected to this procedure.
96
Although the first scheduled trial never took place, Judge
Schwab adopted virtually the same jury-selection procedure sua
97
sponte in November 2007 for the second scheduled trial. Instead of
mailing the questionnaires to the prospective jurors, Judge Schwab
ordered that the Jury Administrator issue summonses to four hundred prospective jurors whereby prospective jurors would report to
the courthouse in groups of sixty and complete the questionnaires in
98
person. Despite this difference in procedure, the jury would remain
99
anonymous as the parties and the court established previously.
The parties would have the right to review the questionnaire after the Jury Administrator detached the last page and so long as the
100
questionnaires remained in the courtroom.
The parties would receive two days to review the questionnaires from each group of sixty—without each questionnaire’s last page—and prepare for Judge
Schwab’s rulings on any “for cause” dismissals, all of which Judge

95

See id.; United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).
Given the intense local-media coverage at the time, it is hard to imagine that the media lacked notice of the jury-selection procedure in the first trial, especially because
(1) the media was partially responsible for the delay in the first trial because of its
appeal and (2) most of the disputes on appeal concerned First Amendment and
common-law right-of-access issues. See generally United States v. Wecht (Wecht I), 484
F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007).
96
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 225 (“grant[ing] a stay of the trial pending [the
court’s] resolution of the various appeals”) (internal citations omitted); see also Wecht
I, 484 F.3d 194.
97
See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). The court needed to obtain a new venire because the initial venire was released based on an unrelated appeal. See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 225.
In selecting a new venire, Judge Schwab decided that adopting the same procedure
and questionnaire without consulting the parties and the media was appropriate because “the Final Jury Questionnaire had already been approved, and the Jury Selection Procedure . . . had existed, without objection, for more than sixteen (16) months.”
United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment of
anonymous jury).
98
See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). Judge Schwab “consulted with other district judges and
the Jury Administrator on the procedure.” Id.
99
See id. Judge Schwab reviewed the venire process used in “other high profile
cases” and concluded that the questionnaires and procedure should otherwise remain in accordance with the jury-selection plan to which the parties agreed in the
first scheduled trial. Id.
100
See id.
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101

Schwab would make in open court and on the record.
Once at a
pool of forty qualified jurors, only the parties would receive the last
page of the questionnaire and thus know the names and addresses of
the forty qualified jurors; the forty qualified jurors would remain
102
anonymous to the public. The parties would then have the opportunity to make additional motions to disqualify any jurors for cause
103
This second round of “for
and to make peremptory challenges.
cause” motions and peremptory challenges would also occur in open
104
court.
During jury selection, Judge Schwab would conduct all proceedings, including the “voir dire questioning of the final qualified pool
of jurors,” in open court, but the media would not receive access to
105
the questionnaires. Instead, the media would receive access to the
106
questionnaires only at the conclusion of trial.
Moreover, Judge
Schwab would not allow the media to remove the questionnaires
from the courtroom or view the last page containing the juror names
107
and addresses. Nonetheless, Judge Schwab would permit any juror
who wanted to reveal his or her identity to do so at the conclusion of
108
trial.
Despite previously agreeing to juror anonymity in the first sche109
duled trial, Wecht objected to the removal of the last page from the
101

Id.
See id.
103
See id.
104
United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment
of anonymous jury).
105
Id.
106
See id. This Comment does not assess whether Judge Schwab appropriately denied the media access to the questionnaires until the conclusion of trial. Instead,
this Comment contends that Judge Schwab had the authority to deny the media
access at least until the conclusion of jury selection.
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
See id. On appeal, the Third Circuit did not consider whether Wecht waived
his right to a public trial by agreeing to juror anonymity and then failing to object in
the first trial. Why the Third Circuit failed to consider this waiver issue is unclear.
While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit permits waiver where the defendant fails to object, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits hold that a defendant cannot waive the right to a public trial under the Sixth
Amendment unless clear evidence demonstrates that the defendant did so knowingly. See United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2006); Walton v. Briley,
361 F.3d 431, 433–34 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 359–60
(2d Cir. 1997). Where the Third Circuit stands on this circuit split is unclear. Compare United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding that the
102
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110

questionnaires in the second trial.
WPXI, Inc., PG Publishing
Company, and Tribune Review Publishing Co. (collectively the “Media-Intervenors”) also filed a motion to challenge the order and requested that Judge Schwab make the names and addresses of the four
111
hundred prospective jurors available.
In December 2007, Judge
Schwab ruled that the initial order for an anonymous jury would
112
stand.
113
The Media-Intervenors appealed to the Third Circuit.
On
January 9, 2008, the Third Circuit ordered Judge Schwab to disclose
all four hundred prospective jurors’ names and addresses to the par114
ties and the Media-Intervenors before empaneling the jury.
On
115
August 1, 2008, the court issued its opinion.
B. Majority Opinion
The majority of the court held that the Media-Intervenors’ First
116
Amendment right of access “requires disclosure of jurors’ names.”
After briefly reviewing the “right of access jurisprudence,” the court
set out to apply the “experience and logic” test from Press-Enterprise II
to determine whether the names and addresses of prospective jurors
defendant’s failure to object either personally or via counsel to the court’s exclusion
of all spectators except the press from the courtroom constituted a waiver of the
right to a public trial), with United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 604–
05 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that the defendant did not waive the right to a public trial
where the defendant’s attorney acquiesced to the clearing of the courtroom but told
the court that the defendant might take issue later with the right to a public trial).
110
See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007)
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). Wecht also moved for the voir
dire of all four-hundred prospective jurors in open court. See id. By making this motion, Wecht wanted each prospective juror’s answer on the questionnaire repeated
orally in court. See id.
111
See id. The Media-Intervenors, like Wecht, requested that the voir dire either
take place in person in open court or that all of the questionnaires be read in open
court. See id.
112
See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2008); see
generally United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury). Use of the term “anonymous jury” is a misnomer here because the jury is anonymous to all parties and the public until the venire is narrowed
to forty prospective jurors. At this time, the jury is no longer anonymous to the parties because they receive the last page of the questionnaire. The jury, however, remains anonymous to the public throughout the remainder of the trial because the
public never receives the last page of the questionnaire.
113
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 226.
114
See id. at 227.
115
See id. at 222.
116
Id. at 233.
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“are subject to a presumptive right of public access under the First
117
Amendment.”
Under the experience prong, the majority concluded that “jurors’ names have traditionally been available to the public prior to
118
the beginning of trial.” The court observed that in Press-Enterprise II,
the Supreme Court looked at over one-thousand years of history
119
when employing the experience prong.
The court acknowledged
that a tradition of concealing jurors’ names and addresses had devel120
oped over the past forty years in light of legislation by Congress.
Nonetheless, instead of factoring in the technological advances over
the last forty years and their affect on how the media covers trials, the
majority downplayed the significance of the last forty years relative to
the last one thousand years by placing equal weight on all one thou121
sand years.
The court found that small, local communities, where
“most people have known each other,” have traditionally formed the
122
pool from which the courts selected jurors. The court asserted that
when it combined this small-community dynamic with the tradition of
123
open voir dire, there is strong evidence that the public must have
124
Consequently, the majority deterknown the jurors’ identities.
mined that a strong tradition of openness and a weak tradition of
125
anonymous juries existed historically.
Under the logic prong, the majority concluded that “the benefits
of public access” outweighed the risks associated with “public know126
ledge of jurors’ identities.”
Beginning with the risks, the court
stated that the dangers of public access include attempts by others to
117

Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 237.
119
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 236.
120
See id. In this regard, the Court highlighted 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7). See id.
For more on 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7), see supra Part II.A.
121
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 237.
122
See id. at 235.
123
Some scholars have suggested that traditionally little opportunity existed to
voir dire prospective jurors. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could
the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 217
(1981) (“[In the] eighteenth-century jury trial . . . the accused took the jury as he
found it and virtually never employed his challenge rights. Indeed, at the Old Bailey
only two 12-man jury panels were used to discharge the entire caseload of as many as
a hundred felony trials in a few days. Each jury usually heard several unrelated cases
before deliberating on any.”).
124
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 235.
125
See id. at 237.
126
Id. at 238–39.
118
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influence or threaten jurors, resistance by jurors against participating
in high-profile trials to protect their privacy, and dishonesty by jurors
during voir dire to prevent the “disclosure of embarrassing informa127
tion.” The court, however, rejected each risk because releasing the
128
jurors’ names after trial would not eliminate the threat. The majority contended that releasing the jurors’ names after the trial could
still subject jurors to retaliation, generate privacy fears, and create
129
anxiety about revealing sensitive information.
Furthermore, the majority asserted that the public has the right
to know who is exercising the power that decides “the fate of someone who [sic] the state has targeted for prosecution” because the
130
“judicial system benefits from . . . public access.” First, the court insisted that it only makes sense that the public know who is exercising
this power given that the public has the right to attend voir dire proceedings and watch the trial, which is where the jurors use this pow131
er.
Second, the court maintained that knowing the identity of
those exercising this power verifies juror impartiality to the public,
roots out corruption and bias, and instills public confidence in the
132
system. Thus, the court asserted that public access has a democratic
133
function in that it promotes public accountability.
The majority suggested that if a district court judge is concerned
about excessive media coverage, then that judge should make findings on a case-by-case basis to show a compelling government interest
134
that would otherwise be impaired.
In this case, the court did not
find any compelling government interest because Judge Schwab
135
failed to make any findings on the matter. As a result, the majority
found that media access to the jurors’ names was crucial and the reasons to withhold the jurors’ names were not compelling enough to
136
overcome the findings in favor of public access by empanelment.

127

Id. at 238.
See id. at 238, n.29.
129
See id.
130
Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 238.
131
See id.
132
See id. at 239.
133
See id. at 238.
134
See id. at 239. The Third Circuit did not provide examples of a compelling governmental interest.
135
See id. at 239–42.
136
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 239; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that the Third Circuit’s stated holding—that the right of access attaches by or no
128
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Consequently, the court concluded that a First Amendment right of
137
access attaches to prospective jurors’ names and addresses.
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Van Antwerpen argued that the majority’s
application of the “experience and logic” test ignored “a substantial
volume of case law, statutes passed by Congress, and the established
138
practices of many of this country’s courts.”
Thus, the dissent reasoned that if the majority’s precedent is allowed to endure, it “will
undoubtedly cause significant problems and delays in our district
139
courts.”
Under the experience prong, Judge Van Antwerpen concluded
that access to jurors’ names and addresses has not been traditionally
available to the public and that the majority erred by failing to recognize the traditional discretion district courts have over jury-selection
140
procedures. The majority reached its conclusion that “the names of
jurors must . . . have been common knowledge” merely because the
141
Judge
voir dire proceeding was “traditionally open to the public.”
Van Antwerpen argued that while voir dire proceedings were traditionally open, the majority drew an incorrect inference when it con142
cluded that juror names were also available to the public.
Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the majority should
have placed more emphasis on the recent traditions of judicial control that developed in response to the “increased media presence and
later than empanelment—is incorrect because the majority implied that this right
actually attaches, at least, during voir dire). The Third Circuit’s opinion does not
indicate that it considered remanding the case for factual findings. If the Third Circuit remanded for this purpose, then Judge Schwab could have made specific findings of fact to determine whether the government had a compelling interest that
would support closure.
137
See id.; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
138
Wecht II, 527 F.3d at 243 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).
139
Id.
140
See id. at 252.
141
Id.
142
See id. Judge Van Antwerpen and the majority do not discuss the possibility
that a party could ask prospective jurors their names during voir dire, assuming that
the trial judge would permit such a question. By doing so, the public would learn
the names of the prospective jurors. Still, if the parties learned the prospective jurors’ names before voir dire because they had a juror list, then nothing guarantees
that every attorney would ask or use every prospective juror’s name during voir dire
to make all of the names available to the public. Moreover, juror addresses would
not likely be a subject of discussion if the attorneys had the addresses prior to voir
dire.
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143

role in judicial proceedings.”
In particular, Judge Van Antwerpen
highlighted the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pervasive mod144
ern media in Sheppard in 1966.
Judge Van Antwerpen contended
145
that Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 in
response to Sheppard and thereby codified the inherent discretionary
powers that courts traditionally exercised throughout the United
146
States to limit “prejudicial influences.”
Finally, Judge Van Antwerpen noted that much of the case law since the 1960s recognizes the
inherent power of district court judges to deny access to the names of
147
prospective jurors.
Consequently, the dissent concluded that jurors’ names and addresses were not “historically known to the pub148
lic.”
Under the logic prong, the dissent concluded that the public
disclosure of prospective jurors’ names before trial is not “significantly important to the public’s ability to oversee the jury selection
process” and does not “ensure the judicial system functions fairly and
149
effectively.” Using a list of factors set out in the Third Circuit’s de150
cision in United States v. Smith, Judge Van Antwerpen argued that
access to jurors’ names did not benefit the public before empanel151
ment. In fact, Judge Van Antwerpen contended that the public has

143

Id. at 255–56.
Wecht II, 527 F.3d at 255 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).
145
Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869
(2006)).
146
Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 252–54 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Van Antwerpen suggested that the legislative history relating to the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) supports the conclusion that a diversity of practices already existed regarding anonymous juries in 1968 and that Congress
merely codified existing practice. See id. at 253. Moreover, Judge Van Antwerpen
argued that judicial conferences in the 1960s and 1970s also found that anonymous
juries were consistent with tradition. See id. at 253–54.
147
See id. at 254–55.
148
Id. at 256.
149
Id. at 256–57.
150
123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997). These factors are (1) “promotion of informed
discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more complete
understanding of the judicial system;” (2) “promotion of the public perception of
fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the proceedings;” (3) “providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion;” (4) “serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny;” (5) “enhancement of the
performance of all involved;” and (6) “discouragement of perjury.” Id. at 146–47 (citations omitted).
151
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 257–58 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).
144
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a stronger argument for access after trial because knowing the outcome allows the public to ascertain the success of the process more
152
effectively.
In addition, the dissent asserted that the “potential dangers of
153
public access” are significant. Judge Van Antwerpen observed that
the courts permit public access to trials to promote the public interest, which Judge Van Antwerpen defined as “fair and orderly trials
154
presided over by unbiased jurors.” Yet the dissent further observed
that excessive pretrial access paradoxically endangers this public in155
Judge Van Antwerpen assumed that the media will use juterest.
156
rors’ names and addresses to write stories about these jurors. This
creates the danger that research will involve speaking to jurors, or at
157
least their families and friends during pretrial.
Additionally, it
creates the danger that the media will intrude upon prospective jurors’ privacy even though the government requires private citizens to
158
serve on juries. Of particular concern, friends and enemies of the
defendant will be in a better position to “exert influence” over ju159
rors. Still, even in the absence of harassment, the media attention
could make jurors less willing to serve and, if they serve, less willing to
160
provide honest answers during voir dire.
The dissent concluded that the negatives of pre-empanelment
access outweigh the benefits that public access will provide the system. In particular, Judge Van Antwerpen contended that access to
jurors’ names could tarnish the impartiality of the jury, add to the
struggle of finding “an uninformed jury,” and make the jurors vul161
nerable to harassment. Nonetheless, the dissent indicated that this
balancing is difficult, and because it depends on the specifics of each
case, the court should leave this determination to the judgment of
162
district judges.
152

See id. at 258 n.63.
Id. at 258.
154
Id. at 258–59.
155
See id.
156
See id. at 258.
157
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 258 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).
158
See id.
159
Id.
160
See id. at 257–58.
161
Id at 259.
162
See id. at 259 nn.66–67. Judge Van Antwerpen argued that the majority
stretched the case law to represent more than it really says because most of the ma153
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The dissent pointed to United States v. Black and Gannett Co. v.
State as two examples in which courts considered high-profile cases
similar to Wecht II and drew the conclusion that the “experience and
logic” test cannot support a First Amendment right of access to pros165
pective jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment. In both
cases, the parties knew the jurors’ identities and conducted voir dire
in open court, but the judge withheld the prospective jurors’ names
166
from the media. Judge Van Antwerpen highlighted that the court
in each case did not find a historical tradition of public access to jurors’ names because neither court inferred such a right simply from
the fact that courts traditionally drew jurors from small local com167
munities.
Additionally, Judge Van Antwerpen alluded to the Black
court’s argument that access to the voir dire process satisfies the First
Amendment while access to jurors’ names created too many dangers
168
to the proper functioning of the jury.
Supporting this argument,
the dissent emphasized the Gannett court’s assertion that the connection between the goals of public access and knowledge of jurors’
169
Consequently, Judge Van Antwerpen concluded
names was weak.
that Black and Gannett, though not binding, represent the approach
170
the majority should have taken in Wecht II.
164

IV.THE “EXPERIENCE AND LOGIC” TEST DOES NOT SUPPORT A
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES
OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Using the “experience and logic” test, the Third Circuit in Wecht
II incorrectly held that the First Amendment provides the media with
a right of access to the names and addresses of prospective jurors
prior to empanelment. First, the Third Circuit failed to consider the
jority’s support came from cases that arose from post-trial access concerns rather
than pretrial access concerns. See id. at 259 n.66.
163
483 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (using the “experience and logic” test to
hold that a newspaper did not have a First Amendment right of access to obtain jurors’ names during trial).
164
571 A.2d 735 (Del. 1990) (upholding lower court’s order to withhold prospective jurors’ names in a high-profile murder trial because no First Amendment right
of access to jurors’ names exists).
165
Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 259–60 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting).
166
See id. at 260 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 620–21; Gannett, 571 A.2d at 737).
167
See id. at 261 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 626; Gannett, 571 A.2d at 751).
168
See id. at 260 (citing Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 628).
169
See id. at 261 (citing Gannett, 571 A.2d at 751).
170
See id. at 261–62.

FERSKO (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

788

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

5/20/2010 5:00 PM

[Vol. 40:763

federal common-law right of access before searching for a new constitutional right. Second, the Media-Intervenors sought access to information contained within the prospective jurors’ questionnaires
and not to the actual voir dire proceedings. It is not clear that the
First Amendment right of access even applies to documents while the
common-law right of access is clearly applicable.
Last, assuming that the First Amendment right of access does
apply to documents, the Third Circuit nonetheless misapplied the
“experience and logic” test. Under the experience prong, the court
reviewed common-law traditions but failed to recognize that public
knowledge of prospective jurors’ names and addresses was historically
a function of demographics, not a specific procedural guarantee.
Additionally, the court completely ignored the country’s statutory
traditions, which suggest that the statutes only entitled the defendant,
and thus the public, to the identity of prospective jurors in capitaloffense trials. The court also overlooked recent trends that have resulted in greater judicial discretion over jury selection. Under the
logic prong, the Third Circuit highlighted legitimate policy concerns
that would arise if it did not recognize a right of access, focusing on
the need to hold jurors accountable to the public. The court, however, failed to balance these concerns against the greater harm that extending the right of access to prospective jurors’ identities could
cause in high-profile trials—namely, diminished district court discretion over jury selection. Consequently, the Third Circuit should not
have held that the media has a right of access under the First
Amendment to the names and addresses of prospective jurors before
171
empanelment.
A. The Third Circuit Should Have Decided Wecht II on Common-Law
Right of Access Grounds, Not on First Amendment Grounds
The Third Circuit, in the interest of constitutional avoidance,
should have attempted to address the Media-Intervenors’ access
claims under the common-law right-of-access doctrine rather than
creating a new constitutional right. In Wecht II, the court quickly recognized and disregarded the Media-Intervenors’ argument that the
public has a common-law right of access to the prospective jurors’

171
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that the Third Circuit’s stated
holding—that the right of access attaches no later than empanelment—is incorrect
because the majority implied that this right actually attaches, at least, during voir
dire).
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172

questionnaires.
Why the court ignored this common-law tradition
173
is unclear and problematic.
The decision to apply the “experience and logic” test in Wecht II
presumes that the First Amendment right of access provides a publicaccess right to documents as well as to judicial proceedings. The Media-Intervenors did not request access to the voir dire proceedings
174
given that the jury selection was to occur in open court.
Instead,
the Media-Intervenors sought the names and addresses of the prospective jurors by requesting the full prospective-juror questionnaires,
175
including the last page with the jurors’ names and addresses.
When the Supreme Court created the “experience and logic”
test, it relied on a series of cases establishing a First Amendment right
of access to courtroom proceedings in criminal trials and, by exten176
sion, the proceedings surrounding the trial, such as voir dire. The
Supreme Court, however, has yet to extend its right-of-access jurisprudence under the First Amendment from proceedings to documents. While some courts have implied a right of access to court
documents under the First Amendment, other courts have not fol177
lowed suit.
If the First Amendment does not cover court documents, then the Wecht II court applied the wrong law.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has established a right to
judicial documents and information under the federal common-law
178
right-of-access doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court has not

172

See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 233 n.21.
The court stated that the Media-Intervenors failed to develop this point in
their brief. See id. at 233. For unknown reasons, the court did not ask the parties to
develop their arguments on the common-law access question further.
174
See United States v. Wecht, No. 2:06-cr-00026-AJS (W.D. Penn. Dec. 21, 2007)
(order requiring empanelment of anonymous jury).
175
See id.
176
See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S.
1 (1986) (declaring right of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (declaring right of access to
voir dire); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (declaring
right of access to criminal trials).
177
Compare Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (permitting
access to filed documents in a civil case because the First Amendment right of access
to criminal trials should also apply to civil cases), with United States v. McVeigh, 119
F.3d 806 (10th Cir. 1997) (disallowing access on First Amendment grounds to filed
document sealed by the court in a criminal proceeding), and United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee access beyond the right to attend trials).
178
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
173
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flushed out this common-law right in detail, the Court has held that
the public has a common-law right “to inspect and copy public
records and documents, including judicial records and docu179
ments.” The purpose of this common-law right of access is to “monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty,
180
and respect for our legal system.” This right is “not absolute,” but
the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is difficult to distill . . .
or to identify all the factors to be weighed in determining whether
181
access is appropriate.”
As a result, district courts should exercise
their discretion “in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of
182
the particular case.”
The fact that the Third Circuit ignored the common-law right of
access is puzzling and creates a quandary for district courts that rely
upon judicial discretion to cope with high-profile trials. First, the
Media-Intervenors sought the prospective jurors’ questionnaires, but
the First Amendment right of access does not necessarily apply to
documents, while the common-law right of access clearly does apply.
Second, the Supreme Court places discretion squarely with the district courts, while the Third Circuit removes that discretion. Under
the common-law right of access, district courts may restrict access because of prejudicial publicity before trial, third parties’ privacy inter183
ests, and impairments to the trial’s efficiency.
Moreover, because
appellate courts review district courts’ rulings on the common-law
right of access under an abuse-of-discretion standard, appellate review should pay great deference to lower courts’ rulings on common184
law access issues. By ignoring the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s
obvious preference to honor district court discretion, the Wecht II decision creates questions as to how much power the district courts have
to control the publicity inherent in high-profile trials.
B. Misapplying the “Experience and Logic” Test in Wecht II
Assuming that the First Amendment covers the MediaIntervenors’ request for documents—in this case the juror questionnaires—then the Third Circuit was correct to use the “experience
179

Id. at 597–99.
In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1303, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984).
181
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–99.
182
Id. at 599.
183
See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–50 (2d Cir. 1995).
184
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
180
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and logic” test in Wecht II, but the Wecht II decision did not apply the
test correctly. Under the experience prong, the court failed both to
unearth a history of public access concerning prospective jurors’
names and addresses and to consider this history based on the rise of
185
modern media and communications technology.
Under the logic
prong, the Court failed to properly account for the risks that public
access poses both to prospective jurors and to the criminal-justice system in high-profile trials. If the Third Circuit properly accounted for
these risks, the Court could not have claimed that disclosure of the
prospective jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment would
have a “significant positive role in the functioning of the [jury186
selection] process.” As a result, the balance of the experience and
logic prongs weighs against a First Amendment right of access and,
thus, against a constitutional presumption of access to prospective ju187
rors’ names and addresses.

185
The court is not formally required to emphasize one part of history over
another, but this Comment contends that the court should view all one thousand
years in context by accounting for historical trends. See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, Note,
What Ever Happened to “The Right to Know”?: Access to Government-Controlled Information
Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1131 (1987) (noting that a historical analysis is “inconsistent with the . . . established approach to first amendment
[sic] adjudication” because interpreting the First Amendment “‘in light of current
values and conditions’ . . . free[s] the Court from . . . historical assumption[s]”). For
example, one thousand years ago, media coverage was less of a concern because jurors were self-informing fact finders chosen due to their possession of knowledge
about the case. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law,
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 314 (1973). Yet the influence of the media has rightly occupied the courts’ attention over the last half-century because (1) the justice system
today does not want jurors with prior knowledge of the case and (2) the pervasiveness of modern media coverage is likely to make the task of eliminating jurors with
prior knowledge more difficult. Thus, while this Comment argues for greater focus
on more recent traditions, it does not contend that the historical analysis of the experience prong lacks relevance in the right-of-access inquiry. But see, e.g., Wood, supra note 13, at 3–4 (“I find the Court’s reliance on history troubling for at least two
reasons: First, I believe that the Court has given insufficient weight to the dramatic
changes in the criminal judicial process since the drafting of the First Amendment—
changes that make historical experience, divorced from its context, misleading rather than enlightening. Second, I fear that the Court’s heavy emphasis on history
encourages a reliance on analogy at the expense of principled reasoning.”).
186
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(emphasis added).
187
In discussing the First Amendment right of access in the following sections,
this Comment assumes the right of access extends beyond attendance at proceedings
to include access to documents and information. Nonetheless, whether the First
Amendment right of access extends to documents and information is not a settled
issue. See supra Part IV.A.
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The Third Circuit Misapplied the Experience Prong

The experience prong requires that “the place and process have
188
historically been open to the press and general public.” While the
Wecht II court found “public knowledge of jurors’ names” to be “a
189
well-established part of American judicial tradition,” the historical
record proves otherwise. Public knowledge of jurors’ names and addresses was a function of community size rather than a procedure
employed by the courts and designed to disclose jurors’ identities to
190
the public.
When community sizes increased, the public lost its
ability to recognize every juror because the community was too big
191
for everyone to recognize everyone else.
Moreover, courts historically have lacked a procedure for disclosing jurors’ identities to the
public if the identities were not available from the parties’ interac192
tions with the prospective jurors during voir dire. Thus, the historical record highlighted by the court would not yield public knowledge
of jurors’ names and addresses today; an additional act would be necessary to identify the jurors if voir dire did not reveal their identi193
ties. As a result, the traditional process of disclosing jurors’ identities was not a specific procedural guarantee but merely the
coincidental and visual recognition of jurors by other members of the
community during an open courtroom proceeding.
During the eighteenth century, American courts drew jurors
194
from the small, local community where the crime occurred, as was
195
the tradition in England. The venire was composed of white, prop196
erty-owning men. Thus, out of the small number of people living in
a local community, even a smaller number were qualified to serve as
188

Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).
190
See infra notes 194–203 and accompanying text.
191
See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
192
See id.
193
See infra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
194
AMAR, supra note 67, at 88–93; Daniel D. Blinka, “This Germ of Rottedness”: Federal Trials in the New Republic, 1789–1807, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 135, 139 (2003); see
ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 22–36 (tracing the history of juries during the constitutional ratification period and the prevalence of debates on whether to maintain the
tradition of drawing jurors from the local communities).
195
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344.
196
See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 878–82 (1994); see also ABRAMSON, supra note
20, at 29 nn.56–57 (noting that Vermont was the only exception to the propertyownership requirement when the Constitution was ratified in 1787).
189
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jurors. Because the spectators watched the voir dire proceedings,
“everybody knew everybody on the jury,” and all trial spectators, by
virtue of the openness of the proceedings, could observe which jurors
199
the parties chose and which jurors the court excused.
The trial spectators, however, acquired knowledge of the pros200
As the
pective jurors’ identities merely by accident, not by right.
spectators watched the proceedings, they recognized individuals that
they previously knew rather than acquiring the identity of each juror
through some device in the proceeding or access to specific docu201
ments. In other words, the procedural steps of jury selection never
197
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 877. The property-ownership requirements reduced the number of qualified jurors by seventy-five percent in England. See id. While the effect of this requirement in the United States was far less
prohibitive because of the availability of land, at least twenty-five percent of the male
population was not qualified to sit on a jury. See id. When considering the fact that
women, if assumed to make up fifty percent of the population, could not serve, then
the combination reduced the number of qualified jurors to approximately thirtyeight percent of the population.
198
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 506–
08 (1984). In England, “[t]he indictment was . . . read; if the accused pleaded not
guilty, the jurors were called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant was
allowed to make his challenges.” Id. at 507 (citation omitted). As a result, “the entire trial proceeded ‘openly . . . , and as many [others] as be present may heare.’” Id. (citation omitted). The colonials transplanted this process of “[p]ublic jury selection”
in the American Colonies, and thus, it “was the common practice in America when
the Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 508.
199
In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988). Given that membership in
the qualified juror population—being male and a property owner—required all the
marks of privilege, such exclusivity also conceivably led to an individual’s prominence among the local citizenry. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 877; see also
supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200
Some sources indicate that after the defendant pleaded not guilty, prospective
jurors were “called forward, one by one, at which time the defendant was allowed to
make his challenges.” Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 507. This might indicate that the
court called the jurors by name. Yet even if that is the case, this proves that juror
names were used somewhere at some point, but it does not indicate how consistently
most courts followed this process. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also
infra note 202 and accompanying text. Additionally, the order of events suggests a
problem with the process, which moves from calling forth the juror to exercising a
challenge. A juror name, however, is not nearly enough information on which to
exercise a challenge. Thus, either this recitation of the process is inaccurate or the
prospective jurors’ identities were already known to those in the courtroom.
201
See In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[E]verybody knew everybody on the jury and we may take judicial notice that this is yet so in many rural
communities throughout the country. So, everyone can see and know everyone who
is stricken from a venire list or otherwise does not serve. Even in the case before us,
the entire voir dire proceeding was in open court . . . . But the anonymity of life in
the cities has so changed the complexion of this country that even the press . . . does
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included a specific method designed to make the names public. Instead, the public drew the conclusions themselves as a matter of coincidence. The likelihood that the public knew the jurors simply by recognizing people already known to them seems even more probable
when considering the makeup of the juror pool—white men who
203
owned property within a very small community.
Importantly, the Wecht II majority, in its historical analysis, failed
to distinguish between a tradition of making the jurors’ names available by way of access to documentation and a tradition whereby the
public simply recognized jurors by virtue of an open proceeding. As
the court explained, juror anonymity used to be rare because “shielding their identity simply” was too difficult because community size
204
precluded this possibility. Although the size of the local community
205
has changed, the practice of open voir dire proceedings and the
lack of a formal procedure for disclosing jurors’ identities to the pub206
lic have remained unchanged. Thus, if this tradition of jury selection continued, then jurors’ names would not be available without
some further overt act by the court, which would not have been a part
207
of a traditional court proceeding.

not know and cannot easily obtain the names of the jurors and of the veniremen and
women who did not serve in this case.”).
202
For example, unlike the “medieval law . . . in the law books of the time,” the
actual records from the Old Bailey indicate that voir dire was rare in practice, which
buttresses the assertion that there was little aside from coincidence that would allow
the public to recognize the prospective jurors. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial
Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 275–76 (1978). In the Old Bailey, a single
jury would routinely hear a series of cases and then deliberate on all of them at the
same time. See id. at 275. Moreover, unlike the “ad hoc trial commissions,” the defendants at the Old Bailey rarely exercised a challenge to prospective jurors. Id. The
lackluster use of challenges makes sense because “in practice the prosecution and
defense took the jury as they found it” and “no time was spent probing [prospective]
jurors’ backgrounds and attitudes.” Id. at 279.
203
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 196, at 878–82; see also ABRAMSON, supra note
20, at 29 nn.56–57.
204
David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Policy Options 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 30 (1997).
205
See In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988).
206
See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S.
501 (1984).
207
Admittedly, some insignificant practices become so commonplace that they
take on their own importance. Thus, historical accidents can take on constitutional
significance. See Hayes, supra note 185, at 1132 (“[M]any criminal proceedings lack a
common-law tradition of openness but have grown so in importance under modern
practice that closing them defeats the purpose of allowing access to trials.”). For example, public knowledge of trial jurors’ identities ensures their accountability to the
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Aside from common-law traditions, statutory traditions are also
relevant. First, defendants, as distinguished from the media, have
historically had a statutory right to know the jurors’ names within certain limited contexts. For example, in both England and the United
States, defendants had—and still have—a statutory right to know the
names and addresses of the jurors in treason trials because the statute
208
provided a right to the list of jurors prior to empanelment. Given
209
the political nature of treason prosecutions, defendants should
have the names of prospective jurors in voir dire for protection
against government abuses. Although Congress specifically granted
this right to defendants, Congress did not provide a right in the statute to the public. This is particularly significant given that the First
Congress was responsible for passing this particular treason act as well
210
as the First Amendment.
In fact, the First Congress debated and
211
passed the First Amendment before the treason act.
As such, the
First Amendment was a concept well understood by Congress at the

public. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. Nonetheless, the analysis under the experience prong
has to do with whether a practice has been available historically. The “experience
and logic” test deals with questions about the importance of a practice under the logic prong. Hayes, supra note 185, at 1132 (noting that a “major problem with the history prong is that there is no logical link between the history factor and the first
amendment rationale underlying the right of access”).
208
See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (“[A]ny person who shall be
accused and indicted of treason, shall have . . . a list of the jury . . . mentioning the
names and place of abode of such . . . jurors, delivered unto him at least three entire
days before he shall be tried for the same; and in other capital offences, shall have
such copy of the indictment and list of the jury two entire days at least before the trial.”); Treason Act of 1708, 7 Ann., c. 21, §11 (Eng.) (“[W]hen any person is indicted
for high treason, or misprision of treason, a list . . . of the jury, mentioning the
names, profession, and place of abode of the . . . jurors, [shall] be . . . given . . . to the
party indicated.”).
209
See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 38–39 (discussing the politics surrounding
Aaron Burr’s treason trial). President Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were known
to have held animosity for one another. See id. When Burr was on trial for treason
during Jefferson’s presidency, “the federal marshal who summoned the grand jury
had acted illegally by choosing substitutes at his own discretion for any persons excused; the proper procedure . . . was to choose from among the bystanders at court. .
. . [Chief Justice John Marshall] agreed with Burr that the federal marshal’s procedure smacked of handpicking the grand jury.” Id.
210
The First Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the states in September 1789. 1
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 88–89 (Sept. 25,
1789) [hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL]. In April 1790, the First Congress passed the
treason act. See generally Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112. The First Congress met from 1789 to 1790.
211
See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112; 1 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note
210, at 88–89.
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212

time Congress passed the treason act. If Congress wanted to imbue
the public and, in particular, the press with a right to juror information based on the First Amendment, it certainly had ample opportunity to do so.
Second, the legislative history indicates that Congress codified
existing judicial practices when it passed the Jury Selection and Ser213
vice Act of 1968.
Congress expressly authorized the district courts
to withhold prospective or actual jurors’ names such that the jurors
214
would remain anonymous to the public if “justice so requires.”
If
Congress was codifying existing practice, then public access to jurors’
names was not part of a well-established tradition in high-profile cas215
es. In fact, as the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
made clear, the tradition might be one that favored judicial discretion to withhold jurors’ names and addresses in cases that “attract
216
unusual publicity.” By ignoring Congress’s findings as to the historical records and reaching its own conflicting conclusions, the Wecht II
majority comes close to encroaching upon a uniquely legislative function.
In addition to the long-term common-law and statutory traditions, the modern trend since the 1960s has been one of increasing
judicial discretion in recognition of the “pervasiveness of modern
217
communications.”
Beginning after World War II, the potential effect of media coverage on a trial changed because of improved com212

Contra Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 726 n.27 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[L]eaders who have drafted and voted for a text are eminently capable of violating their own rules. . . . [Failing to recognize this] would misguidedly give authoritative weight to the fact that . . . Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Act,
which indisputably violated our present understanding of the First Amendment.”).
213
Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869
(2006)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 90-1076, at 11 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1792, 1801.
214
§ 1863(b)(7). The statute does not suggest how long the courts may withhold
the jurors’ identities. Presumably, Congress intended that the courts interpret this
timeframe’s length. First, Congress codified existing practices, which suggests that
Congress was permitting the practices already authorized by the courts. See H.R. REP.
NO. 90-1076, at 11. Second, the statute permits the withholding of identities if justice
so requires, which suggests that the courts make this determination on a case-by-case
basis. § 1863(b)(7).
215
The phrase “justice so requires” may be understood as being equivalent to the
test for overcoming a First Amendment presumption of openness. More likely, however, it should be understood as being consistent with the common-law presumption
of openness, which relies on a trial judge’s discretion to overcome this presumption.
216
FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 409–12.
217
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
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munications technology and the media’s enhanced ability to reach a
218
national audience. By virtue of this shift, the “public” knowledge of
jurors’ identities took on a new meaning, changing from the small,
local community to the national audience. The Supreme Court recognized this change and emphasized the importance of a trial judge’s
219
discretion in countering the invasiveness of the media. Soon after
the Supreme Court recognized the importance of trial-court discretion, Congress codified the existing discretionary powers of district
220
judges.
Moreover, the courts have followed these rules ever since
221
the 1960s.
Consequently, even if the existence of a tradition of
public knowledge of jurors’ names and addresses before the 1960s is
questionable, a tradition of judicial discretion against such disclosure
222
has clearly existed since then. Thus, the increasingly national focus
of television, radio, and new media, such as blogging, has augmented
223
the dangers of public disclosure of jurors’ identities.

218

See generally MICKELSON, supra note 13.
See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358–63.
220
See § 1863(b)(7).
221
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Wong, 40 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.
1988); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987). But see, e.g.,
Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920
F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Mohammed, 538 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C.
2008).
222
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–77 (2003) (indicating that modern
trends are equally important when looking at our legal traditions). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–28 (1997) (indicating that modern trends are
not a part of our country’s historical tradition).
223
For some examples of the new dilemmas that trial courts face in light of advancing technologies, see Deirdra Funcheon, Jurors and Prosecutors Sink a Federal Case
Against Internet Pharmacies, BROWARD-PALM BEACH NEW TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/2009-04-23/news/jurors-and-prosecutors-sinka-federal-case-against-internet-pharmacies/www.wolfgangsvault.com (discussing a mistrial resulting from eight out of twelve jurors using Google, some from home and
some from cell phones, to conduct their own research on the defendants and the
pharmaceutical medications discussed during trial); John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to
Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1, available
at 2009 WLNR 5102471 (noting the recent phenomenon of jurors turning to Blackberries and iPhones to obtain information relevant to the case that was not actually
presented or was expressly excluded from the jury).
219
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The Third Circuit Misapplied the Logic Prong

The logic prong requires that public access play “a significant
224
positive role in the functioning of the particular process.”
The
court found that “the judicial system benefits from a presumption of
225
public access to jurors’ names” prior to empanelment, but a closer
look at the policy justifications suggests that a blanket presumption of
226
disclosure would create more harm than good.
a.

Effect of the Presumption of Openness on Jurors and
the Justice System

Prospective jurors and the criminal-justice system assume a combination of risks in high-profile trials when the public and the media
can access their names and addresses. These risks include (1) the
risk of intimidation, (2) the risk of invasion of privacy, and (3) the
risk of media influence.
Access to jurors’ names in high-profile cases poses the risk that a
friend or enemy of the defendant will intimidate the jurors or that
the press will invade the jurors’ privacy. These are likely the two
227
greatest fears prospective jurors have in high-profile cases.
Although the fear of intimidation is merely an unsubstantiated fear absent actual intimidation, public access to jurors’ names and addresses
certainly creates the opportunity for intimidation and thus increases
228
the risk that it will occur.
The Third Circuit argued that district
224

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9
(1986).
225
United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 (3d Cir. 2008).
226
The logic prong acts as a balancing test because courts weigh the benefits of
public access against the risks of releasing prospective jurors’ identities. See supra
Parts II.C, III.B. Importantly, however, this balancing does not result in an objective
weighing of analogous interests. Instead, the interests on each side are “incommensurate.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring). This leaves courts with “no objective criteria for . . . comparing the
interests at stake.” T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 972 (1987). Thus, balancing requires that courts assign a value to
the various interests and use these assigned values to compare and contrast. See id. at
972–73. Consequently, the logic prong can prove to be particularly difficult because
subjectivity plays a role; that is, consistent outcomes from court to court depend
upon each court assigning relatively similar values to each incommensurate interest.
227
See In re S.C. Press Ass’n, 946 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1991) (authorizing voir dire
without the presence of the media where juror fears made honesty impossible with
media present).
228
Two types of cases are candidates for an anonymous jury: the organized-crime
trial and the high-publicity trial. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 613
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he paradigmatic situation justifying an anonymous jury is an or-
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courts release the jurors’ names at the end of trial anyway, and therefore, jurors will maintain these fears in anticipation of the information’s release because defendant retaliation is possible after the tri229
al.
The Third Circuit’s analysis, however, is problematic. First,
district courts would be ill-advised not to address jurors’ fears before
trial simply because jurors might cling to these fears after the trial
230
concludes.
Second, the court failed to make the distinction be231
A defendant who intimidates
tween intimidation and retaliation.
intends to affect the verdict, whereas a defendant who retaliates seeks
to avenge a guilty verdict and not to influence the deliberation
process. Naturally, most defendants would want to prevent a guilty
verdict, and thus, the risk of intimidation is present to an extent with
232
any defendant. The defendant, however, must harbor an additional motivation beyond the desire for freedom—like revenge—for the
defendant to seek retribution. In addition, why the court believed
that the defendant would blame prospective jurors, whom the court did
not empanel as trial jurors, for a guilty verdict is unclear. Thus, the
likelihood of retaliation is not the same as compared to intimidation
233
during trial.
As for privacy fears, jurors manifest this fear during voir dire
proceedings because prospective jurors want to guard their reputa-

ganized crime trial, where the safety of the jurors becomes an overriding concern.
This is not to say, however, that the withholding of juror information is appropriate
only in organized crime cases. We have previously approved of an anonymous jury
when the case attracts unusually large media attention and arouses deep passions in
the community.”) (citations omitted). The former clearly raises far more substantial
safety issues than the latter. See id. at 613–14. Because this Comment is only concerned with high-profile trials, the remainder of this Comment does not focus on
cases where juror safety is a legitimate concern.
229
See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 n.29 (3d Cir. 2008).
230
Arguably, district courts would amplify jurors’ fears if the jurors understood
that courts planned to do nothing at all.
231
See Wecht II, 537 F.3d at 238.
232
One tool that trial judges have at their disposal is sequestering the jury. This
Comment, however, focuses on prospective jurors, not actual jurors. Thus, the more
extreme action for a trial judge would be to sequester a pool of prospective jurors
rather than just maintaining their anonymity until the actual jurors are selected and
empaneled.
233
Logically, prospective jurors do not have anything to fear, but people’s motivations for fear are not always logical. As a result, prospective jurors may still fear retaliation or intimidation when arriving at the courthouse even though the likelihood of
harm is low and the parties have not selected any of the actual trial jurors. Fear of
intimidation, however, is usually less of an issue in high-profile trials that lay outside
the organized-crime or gang trial context. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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tions and prevent the release of any sensitive information.
Sometimes these privacy interests reach a point that warrants withholding
jurors’ names from the public to shield the jurors from embarrass235
ment. Critics of the anonymous jury argue that prospective jurors
are more honest about their biases and experiences when jurors’
names are public because of the jurors’ concern for their reputa236
237
tions. Yet jurors lie out of concern for their reputations. By lying,
jurors protect their reputations because the sensitive or embarrassing
238
information remains private and undisclosed.
Again, the Wecht II
court argued that when the district courts release the jurors’ names
after trial, the jurors’ information will be public and jurors will fear
239
this eventual release. But far less interest in the trial will exist once
240
the trial is over. Television stations and newspapers are businesses
that must turn a profit. Thus, these media outlets will respond to the
decrease in public interest. By extension, far less interest in prospective jurors will exist after empanelment, which means that the media
outlets will respond similarly. Consequently, the media is less likely
to pursue investigations as vigorously and invade either the trial or

234

See generally Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126–30 (1996) (discussing general
sources of jurors’ fears).
235
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 512
(1984) (“[A] valid privacy right may rise to a level that part of the transcript should
be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect the person from embarrassment.”).
236
See, e.g., Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007).
237
See Richard Seltzer et al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451,
460 (1991) (stating that jurors in the study withheld information because they sought
“to avoid embarrassment” and that “techniques such as pre-voir dire questionnaires
or sequestering jurors for sensitive questions should lead to more truthful responses”). Lying is even more likely to occur when the juror is predisposed to reacting poorly to increased scrutiny. See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and
the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1710 n.240 (2006)
(citing Linda L. Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 205, 213
(1985)).
238
See generally Seltzer et al., supra note 237. Arguably, the information will become public anyway if the press is able to investigate. Yet this is only a deterrent if
the individual juror believes that someone will catch him or her in a lie.
239
See United States v. Wecht (Wecht II), 537 F.3d 222, 238 n.29 (3d Cir. 2008).
240
See United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 725 (D. Mass. 1987) (permitting
the withholding of the jurors’ names from the public for seven days after the verdict
was delivered because the decrease in media attention would adequately protect the
jurors’ privacy).
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prospective jurors’ privacy as persistently after the trial or empanel241
ment, respectively.
Last, the risk that the media will contact or attempt to contact
prospective jurors in high-profile cases is high. The likelihood of its
occurrence surely must increase dramatically in situations where the
district judge empanels an anonymous jury, the media challenges the
jurors’ anonymity, and then the media requests the jurors’ names
242
and addresses. While the media might be more inclined to investigate the jurors’ backgrounds after requesting only their names, the
prospect of the media both investigating and contacting the prospective jurors dramatically increases when the media also requests the
prospective jurors’ home addresses. District judges usually ask that
prospective jurors avoid contact with the media because such contacts
can result in the disclosure of information that the jurors should not
243
hear, including the various opinions in the press. Either result can
corrupt prospective jurors, which is problematic because it depletes
the size of the venire and affects the justice system’s efficiency if the
court must obtain a new venire panel. Additionally, the risk that the
media will contact prospective jurors can heighten jurors’ fears. For
instance, it can increase juror anxiety where a juror might already
244
have concerns about privacy and intimidation.
The increased anxiety can pressure a juror into taking a position without listening to
245
the evidence.
Some empirical studies have confirmed that increased media scrutiny and exposure to views expressed in the press

241
This has certainly been the approach of some district courts. See id. But the
key phrase is “less likely.” Some cases will inevitably result in continued investigations and privacy invasions by the media of actual trial jurors following a verdict or of
prospective jurors following empanelment.
242
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 920 n.20 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating
that the media “is really complaining about . . . the enhanced difficulty of contacting
former jurors to interview them”).
243
A natural response is to suggest that the judge ban any contact between the
jury and media. But this assumes that both the jurors and the members of the press
corps will comply with the order. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310,
311–13 (1959) (describing how jurors sought out news articles on the defendant’s
prior convictions despite instructions from the trial judge to the contrary).
244
See generally King, supra note 234.
245
See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979) (“If ‘the anonymous juror feels less pressure’ as the result of anonymity, this is as it should be—a
factor contributing to his impartiality.”) (citation omitted).
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246

can pressure jurors.
The result is a tendency amongst non247
anonymous juries to conform their decisions to the public’s views.
When district courts are unable to address the effect of highprofile cases on individual jurors at the early stage of jury selection,
the criminal-justice system suffers. For example, juror fears of intimidation and privacy invasions, regardless of their credibility, are a
legitimate concern for the justice system because citizens might be
248
less willing to serve as jurors. Additionally, when jurors are subject
to media influence—in particular media contact—the jurors are of249
ten no longer capable of serving on the jury as a result.
b.

Effects of Anonymity and Jurors’ Obligations to the
Public

The most important policy consideration weighing against juror
anonymity and in favor of public access to prospective jurors’ names
is that the jurors exercise a government power, which requires accountability to the public, not just the parties. Emphasizing how the
jurors exercise a government power, scholars have called the jury the
250
“lower judiciary bench.”
Opponents contend that the country’s
democratic values support a right of public access because allowing
the exercise of such power by unknown persons in secret is not within
246
See generally Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice:
Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331
(1992).
247
See id. at 341. Some might argue it is not always bad for trial jurors to conform
their views to the public’s views. Although this can be true, the public is unlikely to
be equally as informed as are the trial jurors who must sit through all of the testimony, cross-examinations, and evidence presentations. Most members of the public do
not necessarily form their opinion based on such a comprehensive amount of information or swear to act according to the law and facts.
248
See, e.g., JURY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES COMM., ARIZ. SUPREME COURT AD HOC
COMM., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT CONCERNING JUROR ANONYMITY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/SupRptJuryAnon.pdf (“Offering anonymity is a
small gesture that may make the jury experience more comfortable for many who
would otherwise ignore or resent being called to serve.”).
249
For the effect of pretrial publicity on jurors, see Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie
Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations
for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677 (2000); Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod,
Pretrial Publicity: The Media, the Law and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428
(1997).
250
See, e.g., JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 218 (1814) (comparing the jury, as the lower
house relative to the judge, to the House of Representatives, as the lower house relative to the Senate).
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251

the makeup of a democracy.
Accountability, the argument goes,
occurs when the public is in a position to scrutinize the jurors and
ensure that no conflicts of interest, biases, misconduct, or corruption
exist. When this occurs, accountability yields greater reliability in the
252
verdict itself.
In other words, it ensures actual fairness, the “ap253
pearance of fairness,” and “public confidence in the system.”
Although jurors must be accountable to the public, jurors are
not accountable to the public in the same way as judges and elected
officials. Either voters elect public officials or elected officials appoint other public officials—as is the case with federal judges—which
instills a democratic element of control over the process for elected
and appointed officials. Thus, anonymity would be inconsistent with
this democratic element of control. On the other hand, the justice
251

See Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: Jury Tampering
by Another Name?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 14, 15–16 (arguing that the American jury
trial has been public from its beginnings); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 507–09 (1984) (“[T]he entire trial proceeded
openly . . . . This open process gave assurance to those not attending trials that others were able to observe the proceedings and enhanced public confidence. . . . Proceedings held in secret would deny th[e] [public an] outlet [for concern, outrage,
and hostility] and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings
vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders
are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly
selected.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (“People in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are
prohibited from observing.”); In re Balt. Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988)
(“[T]he risk of loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is too great to
permit a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain anonymity.”).
252
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–72.
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even without
such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and its results.
...
. . . A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society’s criminal process “satisfy the appearance of justice,”
and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people
to observe it.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
253
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508.
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system functions best when it insulates jurors from outside pres254
sures, whether these pressures come from the public or the gov255
ernment. Joseph Story insisted,
The great object of a trial by jury in criminal cases is, to
guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part
of rulers, and against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness
on the part of the people. Indeed, it is often more impor256
tant to guard against the latter, than the former.
Story contended that the jury trial protected defendants from the
257
government and the public because the jury was impartial.
Occasionally, anonymity is required because it “promotes impartial deci258
sion making.”
Unlike public officials, jurors obtain their power at
random, and when jurors give up their power, they “inconspicuously
259
In this regard, “anonymity would
fade back into the community.”
254

History supports this concept. Jurors may hold their deliberations in secret.
See generally Shaftesbury’s Trial, (1681) 8 Howell’s St. Tr. 759 (K.B.) (Eng.). Jurors
are immune from prosecution based simply on the outcome of the verdict. See generally Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K.B.). Jurors may even express dissatisfaction with the law under which the state indicts the defendant through jury nullification. See generally The Trial of John Peter Zenger, (1735) 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 676
(N.Y.) (Colonial Am.).
255
See TAYLOR, supra note 250, at 219 (“It is evidently of equal or superior importance to life, liberty, and property, that juries should be independent of kings, presidents, factions, and demagogues . . . . Judges were made independent of the crown
in England, because judgements were made instruments of tyranny. Verdicts of juries may become such instruments. A president can select juries of his own faction,
by his officer, the marshal, and infallibly mould political verdicts.”). Critics might
contend that because verdicts may become instruments of tyranny, the public needs
to know who sits on the jury. This is a good reason to know the trial jurors’ identities, but it generally does not support the proposition that the public should know
the prospective jurors’ identities because prospective jurors have nothing to do with
the verdict. At the same time, critics may still point out that disclosure of prospective
jurors’ identities is important because disclosure allows an observer to determine
whether the parties fairly selected the trial jury or whether anyone collaborated with
the prospective jurors to ensure that the trial jurors were preordained.
256
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1774, at 653 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
257
See id. (“The appeal for safety can, under such circumstances, scarcely be made
by innocence in any other manner, than by the severe control of courts of justice,
and by the firm and impartial verdict of a jury sworn to do right, and guided solely by
legal evidence and a sense of duty.”).
258
United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1988).
259
Id. Jury selection is not entirely random because the parties choose the trial
jurors. Thus, one reason to know the prospective jurors is to ensure that the venire
panel is random in the first place and not skewed by the government. Yet this is why
this Comment advocates that the parties continue to receive the prospective jurors’
identities.
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seem entirely consistent with, rather than anathema to, the jury con260
cept.”
As previously mentioned, opponents of the anonymous jury contend that juror accountability to the public addresses concerns over
conflicts of interest, biases, misconduct, or corruption. Yet voir dire,
where only the judge and the parties know the prospective jurors’
identities, addresses these concerns and is consistently available as a
tool for the parties to root out bias, corruption, and other disqualify261
ing information. On the other hand, relying on the media to scrutinize the jurors for problems is speculative at best. Reliance on the
media assumes that the media will conduct an investigation into the
jurors’ backgrounds, that the media’s investigations will be thorough,
and that the discovered information actually affects whether each juror remains on the jury. The court and the parties cannot ensure
that the media will conduct these inquiries consistently from trial to
trial or that the information will affect the jury’s makeup. Clearly,
any post-trial investigation is a valuable source of information for
many reasons, including gaining insight into the jury’s deliberative
process and trying to uncover corruption or misconduct, which is
much easier once the investigator knows how the jurors voted. Nevertheless, if the voir dire process has a flaw because the parties are
unable to conduct a proper investigation, then the system should not
rely on the media to fix the flaw. Instead, the system should fix the
flaw.
Finally, while accountability is an important issue, only trial ju262
rors must account to the public for the verdict. After all, only trial
jurors cast a vote during jury deliberations, which result in the verdict. Prospective jurors, however, are just that—prospective. In this
regard, timing is crucial to the accountability issue. The balance between risks to the juror and accountability to the public is a matter of
timing. Accountability is most central after the trial because, with the
verdict in hand, the public has a right to know whether the verdict is
260

Id.
See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (suggesting that the purpose
of voir dire is to select an impartial jury). After all, under the scenario for which this
Comment advocates, the parties have access to the prospective jurors’ identities and,
thus, are in a position to investigate.
262
Arguably, prospective jurors are accountable, though to a lesser extent, because they have an obligation not to engage in juror misconduct. In this regard,
prospective jurors have an obligation not to take themselves out of contention to be
on the jury by, for example, accepting a payoff so that someone can shape the actual
trial jurors by eliminating undesirable prospective jurors.
261
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reliable. Juror risk, however, is vitally important before the trial because, if the court were to release prospective jurors’ names to the
media, the court would place all of the risks of a trial juror on a prospective juror without knowing whether the prospective juror would
have any say in the verdict.
C. Effect of Wecht II upon Judicial Discretion
By requiring that trial judges disclose the names of the prospective jurors, Wecht II not only imposes a heavier burden on district
court judges who choose to keep prospective jurors anonymous up to
empanelment in high-profile trials, it also violates the Supreme
Court’s and Congress’s clear preference that district court judges
263
control the jury-selection process.
By extending the First Amendment right of access to prospective
jurors’ names and addresses before empanelment, Wecht II imposes a
much heavier burden on district court judges than the case law has
previously imposed. Under the First Amendment, district court
judges must overcome an “overriding interest” and closure must be
264
“narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”
Under the common-law
right of access, however, district court judges are not subject to this
265
heightened burden. Instead of “overriding interests,” district court
266
Additionally,
judges must overcome “countervailing interests.”
while the interests at stake under the First Amendment must be “nar267
rowly tailored,” courts must merely balance the interests at stake
under the common law, which allows closure if the “countervailing
268
interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.” Although
the exact definition of these interests is far from clear, courts agree
that the burden of showing “countervailing interests” under the
common law is far easier to meet than the burden of showing “over269
riding interests” under the First Amendment.
263

See supra Part IV.B.1.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984).
265
Id.
266
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
267
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
268
Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
269
Id. (“The common law does not afford as much substantive protection to the
interests of the press and the public as does the First Amendment.”); see also In re
Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The common law does not afford
as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and public as the First
Amendment does.”).
264
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In addition to requiring that district court judges meet a higher
burden to keep prospective jurors anonymous prior to empanelment,
Wecht II also applies the First Amendment’s heightened standard of
review. Under the First Amendment, many of the circuits require
that district court judges jump through a number of procedural
270
hoops to achieve closure.
The Supreme Court also requires that
district court judges make specific findings of fact supporting closure,
provide reasons for denying alternatives to closure, and ensure all of
this is on the record so that the reviewing court can determine
271
whether the ruling was appropriate. All of this suggests that a district court ruling regarding anonymous prospective jurors is reviewed
de novo under the First Amendment. By comparison, the Supreme
Court has stated that closure orders made under the common-law
272
right of access are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Thus, Wecht II
takes the ability to assess the on-the-ground facts away from district
court judges and places this discretion with reviewing courts.
Consequently, Wecht II heightens the district court’s burden
when it attempts to keep prospective jurors’ names and addresses
from the media in high-profile trials while simultaneously placing
control over prospective jurors’ names and addresses with the reviewing courts rather than with the trial courts. Significantly, this shift of
discretionary powers over the jury-selection process from the trial
courts to the appellate courts effectively violates long-standing judi273
cial and congressional policy.
The Supreme Court bestowed control over jury selection upon district court judges decades ago. Since Sheppard, the Supreme Court
has upheld and promoted the district courts’ use of their discretionary powers to combat invasive media coverage in high-profile trials.
For example, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court

270

See, e.g., In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234–35 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that closure motions in a criminal proceeding require public notice and advanced
docketing “to give the public and press an opportunity to intervene . . . , reasonable
steps” to allow participation when the court knows “of the desire of specific members
of the public to be present,” and an opportunity for interested parties “to object to
the request”).
271
See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510–11.
272
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978).
273
Supporting the historical underpinning of judicial discretion, several state and
federal courts have had specific rules permitting juror anonymity for some time. See
Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 746 & n.14 (Del. 1989) (citing United States v.
Breese, 172 F. 765, 768 (W.D.N.C. 1909); State v. Felts, 133 F. 85, 92 (C.C.W.D. Va.
1904); United States v. Antz, 16 F. 119, 125 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883)).
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stated, “Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the
first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on
his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample
274
discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.” Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that trial-court rulings relating
to the common-law right of access are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which suggests great deference to trial court discretion on right275
of-access issues. Even before Sheppard, federal courts boldly asserted
that trial courts have vast discretion with which to control voir dire,
including when the court releases prospective jurors’ names to the
276
parties and the public. This discretion over the conduct of voir dire
rightly includes whether voir dire should occur with or without public
knowledge of the prospective jurors’ identities.
Congress has also supported expanded discretionary powers for
district judges by allowing them to determine when prospective ju277
rors’ names should be public.
With Wecht II, the Third Circuit
creates doubt as to what discretionary power district judges now have
to control the release of prospective jurors’ names in high-profile trials, especially regarding what burden judges must overcome to restrict release. By finding that the media has a presumptive First
Amendment right of access to the prospective jurors’ names and addresses, the Third Circuit adds to the difficulty of district judges already burdened by the problems generally associated with highprofile trials and the responsibility for ensuring a fair and impartial
jury.
V.CONCLUSION
The Wecht II decision fails to recognize that “today’s high visibility trials” put pretrial publicity “at another order of magnitude” than
278
the courts have experienced historically. Now more than ever, dis-

274

451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981).
See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
276
See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) (holding that trial
courts have the discretion to determine when to release the jury lists in noncapitaloffense trials); see also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 407 (1894); United
States v. Wilson, 104 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1939); Hendrikson v. United States, 249 F.
34, 35–36 (4th Cir. 1918); Shelp v. United States, 81 F. 694, 696–97 (9th Cir. 1897).
277
See generally supra Part II.A. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §
1863(b)(7) (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
278
Valerie P. Hans, The Twenty-First Century Jury: Worst of Times or Best of Times?,
CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2006, at 3, 4, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/
275
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trict courts need the discretion to determine how best to approach
279
the complex aspects of pretrial media coverage. Wecht II denies district courts one important approach—control over the timing of the
release of prospective jurors’ identities to the public.
In creating a new constitutional right under the First Amendment to obtain the names and addresses of prospective jurors before
empanelment, the Third Circuit ignores common-law traditions, previous determinations by the Supreme Court, and previous enactments by Congress. Additionally, the Third Circuit disregards the
risks to prospective jurors and the judicial system, in favor of an unsubstantiated claim that the public needs the prospective jurors’
identities to ensure a fair process. Not only is the notion of public
accountability difficult to substantiate with respect to jurors that have
yet to render a verdict for which they must be accountable, the idea
that prospective jurors must also be accountable for a verdict that
they may never render is illogical. The Third Circuit favors public
accountability at the beginning of the trial process because disclosure
will bring fairness to the process. But the Third Circuit never substantiates its fundamental premise that disclosure of prospective jurors’ identities to the media actually and positively influences prospective jurors’ impartiality.
What matters in jury selection is whether the jurors are impartial
and represent the diverse cross-section of American society as it exists
within the particular community; their names and addresses are irrelevant when the parties are informed and voir dire is available. It is
no accident that the U.S. Post Office released its “Jury Duty” stamp in
280
2007 with twelve faceless, diverse jurors pictured. “Stamps, at their
best, can remind a nation . . . what values its citizens hold most sa281
The justice system relies on “faceless” jurors, representing
cred.”
journal/clb/documents/Spring2006TheTwenty-FirstCenturyJuror-TheWorstofTimes
orTheBestofTimes-byProfessorValerie_000.pdf?rd=1.
279
In the trial of Martha Stewart for securities law violations, the district court
judge, deciding that the media coverage could bias the jury before it was selected,
closed the voir dire proceedings to the press. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 96
(2d Cir. 2004). The court order would provide the public with a transcript the following day. See id. at 95. While the Second Circuit held that the trial judge lacked a
compelling justification for closing the proceedings, the Second Circuit stated that it
did “not see why simply concealing the identities of the prospective jurors would not
have been sufficient.” Id. at 104, 106. Yet the Third Circuit, in Wecht II, would deny
the trial court the discretion to consider this option.
280
Debra Cassens Weiss, Stamp of Approval for Jury Service, A.B.A. J., Sept. 5, 2007,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/stamp_of_approval_for_jury_service/.
281
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the community’s interests, to appear in open court, fulfill their service requirement, and, just as quickly, disappear from the public
stage.

